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Abstract—Given a certain complexity level, humanized agents
may select from a wide range of possible tasks, with each
activity corresponding to a transient goal. In general there
will be no overarching credit assignment scheme allowing to
compare available options with respect to expected utilities.
For this situation we propose a task selection framework that
is based on time allocation via emotional stationarity (TAES).
Emotions are argued to correspond to abstract criteria, such
as satisfaction, challenge and boredom, along which activities
that have been carried out can be evaluated. The resulting
timeline of experienced emotions is then compared with the
‘character’ of the agent, which is defined in terms of a preferred
distribution of emotional states. The long-term goal of the agent,
to align experience with character, is achieved by optimizing the
frequency for selecting the individual tasks. Upon optimization,
the statistics of emotion experience becomes stationary.
I. INTRODUCTION
A wide range of specific tasks can be handled efficiently by
present day robots and machine learning algorithm. Playing a
game of Go is a typical example [1], with CT-scan classifica-
tion [2] and micro-helicopter piloting [3] being two other tasks
that are accomplished with comparative modest computational
resources. As a next step one may consider agents that have not
just a one, but a range of capabilities. like being able to play
several distinct board games. Classically, as in most today’s
applications, a human operator interacting with the program
decides which of the agents functionality he or she wants
to access. Humanized agents may however be envisioned to
function without direct supervision, also with respect to task
selection [4]. Autonomous agents that are endorsed with the
capability to connect on their own to either a Go or a chess
server could be matched f.i. with either a human opponent,
upon entering the queuing system, or with another board-
playing program. The problem is then how to allocate time
[5], namely how to decide which type of game to play.
Deciding what to do is a cornerstone of human activities,
which implies that frameworks for multi-task situations de-
serve attention. A possible route is to define and to maxi-
mize an overarching objective function, which could be, for
example, to play alternatively Go or chess in order to improve
the respective levels of expertise, as measured, f.i., by the
respective win rates. This example suggest that time-allocation
frameworks need two components, see Fig. 1:
• A set of criteria characterizing tasks that have been
executed, the experience of the agent.
• A set of rules for task switching that are based fully or
in part on experiences.
Implementations may distinguish further between dedicated
and humanized settings. For a specific dedicated application
appropriate hand-picked sets of evaluation criteria and switch-
ing rules can be selected. Within this approach the resulting
overall behavior can be predicted and controlled to a fair
extend. Being hand-crafted, the disadvantage is that extensions
and transfer to other domains demand in general extensive
reworks.
Consider an agent with two initial abilities, to play Go
and chess via internet servers. The respective winning rates
could be taken in this case as appropriate evaluation criteria,
other may be a challenge (close games) and boredom (games
lasting forever). As an extension, the agent is provided with
a connection to a chat room, where the task is to answer
questions. Humans would sent in chess board positions and
the program provide in return the appropriate analysis, e.g.
in terms of possible moves and winning probabilities. The
program has then three possibilities, as shown in Fig. 1, to play
Go or chess, and to connect to the chat room, with the third
task differing qualitatively from the first two. Time allocation
frameworks designed specifically for the first two options, to
play Go or chess, would most probably cease to work when
the chat room is added, f.i. because winning ratios are not
suitable for characterizing a chat session. Here we argue that
a characteristic trait of humanized computing is universality,
which translates in the context of time allocation frameworks
to the demand that extensions to new domains should be a
minor effort.
Of particular interest to humanized time allocation frame-
works is emotional control, which is known to guide human
decision making. Starting with an overview, we will discuss
first the computational and neurobiological role of mammalian
emotions, stressing that algorithmic implementations need to
reproduce functionalities and not qualia like fear and joy. A
concrete implementation based on the stationarity principle is
then presented in a second step. Synthetic emotions correspond
in this framework to a combination of abstract evaluation
criteria and motivational drives that are derived from the
objective to achieve a predefined time-averaged distribution
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Fig. 1. Illustration of a general time-allocation framework. The different
options, here to play Go, to play chess and to chat, are evaluated once selected,
with the evaluation results feeding back into the decision what to do next.
of emotional activities, the ‘character’ of the agent.
An alternative to the here explored route to multi-task
problems is multi-objective optimization [6], a setting in
which distinct objectives dispose of individual utility function
that need to be optimized while respecting overall resource
limitation, like the availability of time. We focus here on
emotional control schemes, noting that emotional control and
multi-objective optimization are not mutually exclusive.
II. COMPUTATIONAL ROLE OF EMOTIONS
Emotions have emerged in the last decades as indispensable
preconditions for higher cognition [7], [8], with the reason
being that the core task of emotional response is not direct
causation of the type “fleeing when afraid”, akin to a reflex,
but the induction of anticipation, reflection and cognitive
feedback [9]. In general, being afraid will not result in a
direct behavioral response, but in the allocation of cognitive
resources to the danger at hand.
The interrelation between emotion and cognition is two-
faced. Emotions prime cognitive processes [10], being con-
trolled in return by cognition [11]. The latter capability, to
regulate emotions [12], f.i. when restraining one’s desire for
unhealthy food, is so pronounced that it can be regarded to
be a defining characteristics our species [13]. With regard to
synthetic emotions, it is important to note that the cogno-
emotional feedback loop present in our brain implies that
emotional imprints are induced whenever cognitive capabilities
are used to pursue a given goal, such as playing and winning
a game of Go [14].
On a neuronal level one may argue [15], that the classical
distinction between affective and cognitive brain regions is
misleading [16]. Behavior should be viewed instead as a
complex cogno-emotional process that is based on dynamic
coalitions of brain areas [17], and not on the activation of a
specific structure, such as the amygdala [18]. This statement
holds for the neural representations of the cognitive activity
patters regulating emotional reactions, which are not localized
in specific areas, but distributed within temporal, lateral frontal
and parietal regions [19].
The mutual interrelation of cognitive and emotional brain
states suggests a corresponding dual basis for decision making
[20]. Alternative choices are analyzed using logical reasoning,
with the outcome being encoded affectively [21]. Here we use
‘evaluation criteria’ as a generic term for the associated emo-
tional values. Risk weighting has similarly both cognitive and
emotional components [22], where the latter are of particular
importance for long-term, viz strategic decision taking [23].
One feels reassured if a specific outlook is both positive and
certain, and uncomfortable otherwise.
The picture emerging from affective neuroscience studies
is that the brain uses deductive reasoning for the analysis
of behavioral options and emotional states for the respective
weighting. A larger number of distinct types of emotional
states [24], like anger, pride, fear, trust, etc, is consequently
needed when the space of accessible behavioral options in-
creases [25].
III. COGNO-EMOTIONAL ARCHITECTURES
A minimal precondition for application scenaria incorporat-
ing a basic cogno-emotional feedback loop is the option for
the program to switch between tasks [26]. An example is a
multi-gaming environment for which the program decides on
its own, as detailed out further below, which game to play
next.
A. Multi-gaming environments
We consider an architecture able to play several games,
such as Go, chess, Starcraft or console games like Atari. The
opponents may be either human players that are drawn from
a standard internet-based matchmaking systems, standalone
competing algorithms or agents participating in a multi-agent
challenge setup [27]. Of minor relevance is the expertise
level of the architecture and whether game-specific algorithms
are used. A single generic algorithm [1], such as standard
Monte Carlo tree search supplemented by a value and policy
generating deep network [28], would do the job. For our
purpose, a key issue is the question whether the process
determining which game to play is universal, in the sense that
it can be easily adapted when the palette of tasks is enlarged,
f.i. when the option to connect to a chat room is added.
For a complete cogno-emotional feedback loop an agent
able to reason logically on an at least rudimentary level would
be needed. This does not hold for the application scenario
considered here. As a consequence, one may incorporate the
feedback of the actions of the agent onto its emotional states
and the emotional priming of the decision process, but not a
full-fledged cognitive control of emotions.
B. Emotional evaluation criteria
In a first step one has to define the qualia of the emotional
states and how they are evaluated, viz the relation of distinct
emotions to experiences. The following definitions are exam-
ples.
– Satisfaction. Winning a game raises the satisfaction level.
This could hold in particular for complex games, that
is for games that are characterized, f.i., by an elevated
diversity of game situations.
– Challenge. Certain game statistics may characterize a
game as challenging. An example would be games for
which the probability to win dropped temporarily precar-
iously low.
– Boredom. Games for which the probability to win re-
mains constantly high could be classified as boring or,
alternatively, as relaxing. The same holds for overly long
games.
Emotions correspond to value-encoding variables, denoted
here with S, C and B, for satisfaction, challenge and boredom.
Games played are evaluated using a set of explicit evaluation
criteria, as formulated above. An important note is that the
aim of our framework is to model key functional aspects of
human emotions, which implies that there is no need, as a
matter of principle, for the evaluation criteria to resemble
human emotions in terms of their qualia. The latter is however
likely to make it easier to develop an intuitive understanding
of emotionally-driven robotic behavior.
C. Direct emotional drivings vs. emotional priming
Standard approaches to modeling synthetic approaches often
assume that emotional state variables are explicit drivers of
actions [29], either directly or via a set of internal motivations
[30]. Here we are interested in contrast in frameworks that are
generic in the sense that behavior is only indirectly influenced
by emotional states [10].
In our case the agent updates in a first step its experience.
For every type of activity, say when playing Go, the probability
that a game of this type is challenging, boring or satisfying
is continuously updated. It could be, e.g., that Go games are
typically more challenging and less boring than chess games.
Based on this set of data, the experience, the next game will be
selected with the aim to align experience as close as possible
with the ‘character’ of the agent, as defined in the following.
D. Aligning experience with character
We define the character CA of the agent as a probability
distribution of emotional states,
CA =
{
PS , PC , PB
}
, PS + PC + PB = 1 , (1)
where PS , PC , PB > 0 are the target frequencies to experience
a given emotional state. Agents with a large PC would pre-
fer for example challenging situations. The overall objective
function of the agent is to align experience with his character.
On a basic level, experience is expressed as a set of N
probability distribution functions,
Eα =
{
pαS , p
α
C , p
α
B
}
, α = 1, . . . , N , (2)
where N is the number of possible activities (playing Go,
chess, connecting to a chat room, ...). For every option α the
agent records, as illustrated in Fig. 2, the probability pαi for
the activity to be satisfying/challenging/boring (i = S/C/B).
Defining with qα the likelihood to engage in activity α, the
overall experience EA is given as
EA =
∑
α
qαE
α,
∑
α
qα = 1 , (3)
where the Eα are defined in (2). The global objective, to align
character CA and experience EA, is achieved by minimizing
the Kullback-Leibler divergence between CA and EA with
respect to the qα. This strategy, which corresponds to a greedy
approach, can be supplemented by an explorative component
that allows to sample new opportunities [31]. Modulo explo-
ration, an activity α is hence selected with probability qα
E. Stationarity principle
Our framework is based on aligning two probability dis-
tribution functions, EA and CA, an information-theoretical
postulate that has been denoted the ‘stationarity principle’ [32]
in the context of neuronal learning [33]. It states, that not
the activity as such should be optimized, but the distribution
of activities. The resulting state is then varying in time, but
stationary with respect to its statistical properties. The under-
lying principle of the here presented framework corresponds
to ‘time allocation via emotional stationarity’ (TAES). Within
this approach the character of the agent serves as a guiding
functional, a stochastic implementation of the principle of
guided self-organization [34].
F. Motivational drives
Up to now we considered purely stochastic decision mak-
ing, namely that activities are selected probabilitistically, as
determined by the selection probabilities qα. An interesting
extension are deterministic components that correspond to
emotional drives. Considering finite time spans, we denote
with pi(Na) the relative number of times that emotion i has
been experienced over the course of the last Na activities.
Ideally, the trailing averages pi(Na) converge to the desired
frequencies Pi. Substantial fluctuations may however occur,
for example when the agent is matched repeatedly to op-
ponents with low levels of expertise, which may lead to an
extended series of boring games. The resulting temporary
discrepancy,
Mi = Pi − pi(Na) , (4)
between desired and trailing emotion probabilities can then
be regarded as an emotional drive. Stochastically, Mi averages
out, as far as possible, when selecting appropriate probabilities
qα to select an activity α. On a shorter time scale one may
endorse the agent with the option to reduce excessive values of
Mk by direct action, viz by selecting an activity β character-
ized by large/small pβk when Mk is strongly positive/negative.
This is however only meaningful if the distribution {pβi }
is peaked and not flat. Emotional drives correspond in this
context to a additional route for reaching the overall goal, the
alignment of experience with character.
G. Including utility maximization
In addition to having emotional motivations, agents will
in general be expected to maximize one or more reward
functions, like gaining credits for wining games or answering
questions in a chat room. Without emotional constraints, the
program would just select the most advantageous option,
given that all options have already been explored in sufficient
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Fig. 2. Aligning experience with character. Behavioral options (playing chess, playing Go, joining a chat) are evaluated along emotional criteria, such
as being satisfying (S), challenging (C) or boring (B). The corresponding probability distributions are superimposed with weights qα = q(α), where
α ∈ {chess,Go, chat}. See Eq. (3). The goal is to align a predefined target distribution of emotional states, the character, with the actual emotional
experience. This can be achieved by optimizing the probabilities qα to engage in activity α.
depth, in analogy to the multi-armed bandit problem [35].
An interesting constellation arises when rewards are weighted
emotionally, e.g. with the help of the Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence Dα between the character and the emotional experience
of a given behavioral option [36],
Dα =
∑
i
Pi log
(
Pi
pαi
)
. (5)
Credits received from behavioral options that conform with the
character of the agent, having a small Dα, would be given a
higher weight than credits gained when engaging in activities
characterized by a large Dα. There are then two conflicting
goals, to maximize the weighted utility and to align experience
with character, for which a suitable prioritization or Pareto
optimality may be established [37].
Instead of treating utility as a separate feature, one may
introduce a new emotional trait, the desire to receive rewards,
and subsume utility under emotional optimization. Depending
on the target frequency PU to generate utility, the agent will
select its actions such that the full emotional spectrum is taken
into account. A relative weighting of utility gains, as expressed
by (5), is then not necessary.
IV. DISCUSSION
Computational models of emotions have focused tradition-
ally on the interconnection between emotional stimuli, syn-
thetic emotions and emotional responses [29]. A typical goal is
to generate believable behaviors of autonomous social agents
[38], in particular in connection with psychological theories
of emotions, involving f.i. appraisal, dimensional aspects or
hierarchical structures [29]. Closer to the scope of the present
investigation are proposals that relate emotions to learning
and such to behavioral choices [39]. One possibility is to
use homeostatic state variables, encoding f.i. ‘well-being’,
for the regulation of reinforcement learning [40]. Other state
variables could be derived from utility optimization, like water
and energy uptake, or appraisal concepts [40], with the latter
being examples for the abstract evaluation criteria used in the
TAES framework. One route to measure well-being consist
in grounding it on the relation between short- and long-term
trailing reward rates [41]. Well-being can then be used to
modulate dynamically the balance between exploitation (when
doing well) and exploration (when things are not as they used
to be). Alternatively, emotional states may impact the policy
[42].
Going beyond the main trust of research in synthetic
emotions, to facilitate human-computer interaction and and
to use emotions to improve the performance of machine
learning algorithms that are applied to dynamic landscapes, the
question that has been asked here regards how an ever ongoing
sequence of distinct tasks can be generated by optimizing
emotional experience, in addition to reward. Formulated as
a time allocation problem, the rational of this approach is
drawn mainly from affective neuroscience [43], and only to a
lesser extend from psychological conceptualizations of human
emotional responses. Within this setting, the TAES framework
captures the notion that a central role of emotions is to serve
as abstract evaluation tools that are to be optimized as a set,
and not individually. This premise does not rule out alternative
emotional functionalities.
V. CONCLUSION
Frameworks for synthetic emotions are especially powerful
and functionally close to human emotions if they can be
extended with ease along two directions. First, when the pro-
tocol for the inclusion of new behavioral options is applicable
to a wide range of activity classes. This is the case when
emotions do not correspond to specific features, but to abstract
evaluation criteria. A given activity could then be evaluated
as being boring, challenging, risky, demanding, easy, and so
on. It is also desirable that the framework allows for the
straightforward inclusion of new traits of emotions, such as
frustration.
Two agents equipped with the identical framework can be
expected to be able to show distinct behaviors, in analogy
to the observation that human decision making is generically
dependent on the character of the acting person. For synthetic
emotions this implies that there should exist a restricted set
of parameters controlling the balancing of emotional states in
terms of a preferred distribution, the functional equivalent of
character. As realized by the TAES framework, the overarching
objective is to adjust the relative frequencies to engage in
a specific task, such that the statistics of the experienced
emotional states aligns with the character.
Choosing between competing reward options can be done
using a variety of strategies [44]. An example is the multi-
armed bandits problem, for which distinct behavioral options
yield different rewards that are initially not known [35]. Hu-
man life is characterized in comparison by behavioral options,
to study, to visit a friend, to take a swim in the pool, and so
on, that have strongly varying properties that come with multi-
variate reward dimensions. As a consequence we proposed to
define utility optimization not in terms of money-like credits,
as it is the case for the multi-armed bandits problem, but on
an abstract level. For this one needs evaluation criteria that are
functionally equivalent to emotions. In this perspective, life-
long success depends not only on the algorithmic capability
to handle specific tasks, but also on the character of the agent.
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